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SIGNING STATEMENTS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

Neil Kinkopf*

Over twenty years ago, Attorney General Edwin Meese touched off a
contentious debate by proposing that judges take presidential signing statements into
account when interpreting statutes. To facilitate this proposal, the Attorney General
persuaded West Publishing Company to include presidential signing statements in
the legislative history it published in the U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News (U.S.C.C.A.N.).' Attorney General Meese's position was fairly straightforward: the President is a significant actor in the legislative process. The
Constitution authorizes the President to recommend to Congress "such Measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient. 2 Moreover, a bill may not become a law
unless it has been presented to the President and has been either approved by him
or passed by Congress over the President's veto.3 Constitutional formalities aside,
the President is a vitally important actor in the legislative process. The President
exercises a great deal of agenda-setting power, especially when the President's party
holds a majority in Congress. The President is in a position to offer incentives and
disincentives to help persuade legislators to vote in favor of the President's
legislative priorities. The President, as head of the executive branch, controls much
of the information that forms the basis of legislative decisionmaking. In these and
other ways, the President is extremely powerful in the legislative arena. Thus, if a
court is attempting to determine the legislative intent behind a piece of legislation,
the published views of the President would seem to be potentially probative. This
innovation was largely developed by a young Justice Department attorney named
Samuel Alito.4
The controversy that the Meese and Alito proposal generated soon died down.
More recently, the Bush administration has followed a practice that has brought
signing statements back to broad public attention, but for different reasons. The
* Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. I wish to thank Matthew Kaynard
for his outstanding research assistance.
PHILIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE

DIRECT ACTION 202-03 (2002).
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 2.
3 See id. art. I, § 7.
' See Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal

Counsel, to Litig. Strategy Working Group (Feb. 5, 1986), availableat http://www.archives
.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/AccO6O-89-269-box6-SG-LSWGAlitotoLSWG-Febl986.pdf.
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Bush administration has used signing statements to issue an unprecedented number
of constitutional objections to new laws-1042 by the end of 2006.' While there is
nothing new in a President using a signing statement to convey his constitutional
objections to a provision of a bill that the President just signed into law, the sheer
number of such constitutional objections issued by the Bush administration has
made the practice noteworthy. There have been two major objections to this use of
signing statements. First, the American Bar Association, among others, has
condemned the practice on the grounds that the President is constitutionally
obligated to veto a bill if the President believes that the bill contains an unconstitutional provision.6 Second, President Bush's signing statements have often been
taken to express a refusal to be bound by provisions of law he believes to be
unconstitutional.7 Some commentators take the position that the President is bound
by the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed' to execute every statute
regardless of his view of the statute's constitutionality.9

5 See Neil Kinkopf&PeterM. Shane, Signed UnderProtest:A DatabaseofPresidential

Signing Statements, 2001-2006 (Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 106), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1022202.
6 See AM. BAR ASs'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE

SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signing
statements/abafinal-signing _statementsrecommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf; Am. Bar
Ass'n, ABA Adopts New Policy on Presidential Signing Statements, Attorney Client
Privilege and Inspector General for the Federal Judiciary, http://www.abanet.org/media/
releases/news080806_1.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
' A careful reading of President Bush's signing statements reveals that, in fact, he has
never openly declared that he will not enforce or be bound by a law because that law is
unconstitutional. The signing statements are, however, replete with instances in which
President Bush declares that he will interpret a law in order to avoid constitutional problems.
In many instances, President Bush interprets the objectionable provision in a way that is

flatly contrary to the plain meaning of the provision's text. For example, in response to the
hundreds of provisions requiring administration officials to submit legislative
recommendations, President Bush has typically declared that he would interpret the provision

as hortatory and not as a requirement. Indeed, President Bush frequently asserts such an
interpretation even after describing the offending provision as enacting, or "purporting" to
enact, a requirement. As a practical matter, this form of interpretation amounts to the same
thing as an assertion that the President will not enforce or be bound by a particular provision
of law. For a discussion of the significant problems raised by the Bush administration's
misuse of the avoidance canon, see Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the
Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1189 (2006) (describing controversial episodes of
executive branch legal interpretation relating to the "War on Terror"); H. Jefferson Powell,
The Executive and the Avoidance Canon, 81 IND. L.J. 1313 (2006) (describing the
differences between executive and legislative understanding of laws that have been passed).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
9 See Christopher N. May, PresidentialDefiance of "Unconstitutional"Laws: Reviving
the Royal Prerogative,21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865 (1994).
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In this Article, I will not address these controversies."0 Rather, I want to address
the issue raised by the Meese proposal but in the specific context of the Bush
administration's signing statements. Should the judiciary or anyone outside the
executive branch" use President Bush's signing statements 12 as a guide to the
meaning of statutes? The short answer is no.
One possible reason for a negative answer is that it is categorically improper to
consider presidential signing statements as an element of legislative history. This
argument was urged against the Meese proposal and takes two forms.' 3 First,
formally, the President is not part of the legislature, and therefore, signing
statements cannot be considered part of the legislative history.' 4 Second, pragmatically, signing statements are easily manipulated so as to reflect not so much the
legislative intent as the preference of the President."5 Neither of these arguments is
ultimately persuasive.
As to the first objection, the Constitution expressly accords the President a
crucial role in the legislative process.' 6 Moreover, Presidents since George
Washington have in fact played a vital role in the legislative process. " The second
l" For what it is worth, I regard the Bush administration's practice as problematic
principally because the substantive constitutional views expressed in President Bush's
signing statements are unwarranted. See Neil J. Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the
President'sAuthority to Refuse to Enforce the Law, 1 ADVANCE 5 (2007), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Kinkopf-Signing%20Statements-Jun%202006-Advance
%20Vol%201.pdf; Posting of David Barron et al., to Georgetown Law Faculty Blog,
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown university-law/2006/07/thanksto the.p.html (July
31, 2006). The volume of objections seriously compounds the substantive problems and can
amount to an assertion that the President is above the law. Kinkopf, supra at 8-10.
"1 A recent study examining nineteen statutory provisions found that agencies did not
enforce six provisions as they were enacted, and of those six, President Bush objected to
three of them for varying reasons within his signing statements. See U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS ACCOMPANYING THE FISCAL
YEAR 2006 APPROPRIATIONS ACTS (2007), availableat http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/

308603.pdf.
12 In this Article, I only consider the statements that express an objection to a statute on
constitutional grounds and that offer an interpretation of the statute in light of that
constitutional objection. To say that I "only" consider such statements, however, may leave
a misimpression. President Bush has issued more than 1000 such objections. Kinkopf &
Shane, supra note 5.
"3 See William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of PresidentialLegislative History: A Critique,

66 IND. L.J. 699, 709 (1990-1991).
14 See id.
"s See id.

16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Id. art. II, § 3; see Popkin, supra note 13, at 709
(describing the President's limited legislative roles within the Constitution).

1" See Frank B. Cross, The ConstitutionalLegitimacy and Significance of Presidential
"Signing Statements, " 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209, 214-15 (1988).
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objection is more powerful. Because a signing statement is not issued until after a
bill has passed both the House and the Senate, Congress has no opportunity to
respond to erroneous or tendentious interpretations set forth in a signing statement. 8
Thus, signing statements should generally be regarded, like all other post-enactment
legislative histories, as unreliable.
There may be circumstances where a signing statement's interpretation is
accompanied by indicia of reliability. For example, where it repeats congressional
testimony offered by administration officials while a bill was under consideration
before Congress or where the interpretation was offered during congressional
debates in the form of a Statement of Administration Policy.' 9 When these indicia
are in place and when the President and the administration have played a central role
in the passage of the legislation, there seems to be no reason-formal or
practical-to exclude the President's signing statement from the legislative history.2'
A second objection to the use of signing statements as an interpretive device is
the claim that legislative history is never a permissible source of statutory meaning.
This broad claim obviously is not limited to the use of signing statements, but rather
objects to the use of any form of legislative history. It is well beyond the scope of
this Article to assess the force of such claims. What is relevant to note, however, is
that President Bush's signing statements themselves appear to accept this argument.2 '
One prominent version of this argument asserts that only text that has been
enacted through the constitutional process of bicameralism and presentment can be
treated as law. To give weight to legislative history would violate what the Supreme
Court has described as the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure" for the enactment of legislation.2 2 In a number of signing statements,
President Bush has included the following objection: provisions "of the Act purport
to allocate funds for specified purposes as set forth in the joint explanatory statement
of managers that accompanied the Act,, 23 or "the Act refers to a joint explanatory
i8 See Popkin, supra note 13, at 713-14 (discussing former President Reagan's
potentially manipulative uses of presidential signing statements).
'9 See Cross, supra note 17, at 232-33 (arguing that contemporaneity of statutory
interpretation between the executive and legislative branches adds a degree of reliability to
presidential signing statements).
20 This view has been fully elaborated by Professor Frank Cross. See id. at 234-38.
21 See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner,PresidentialSigning StatementsandExecutive
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 319-20 (2006) (discussing President Bush's
interpretation and treatment of statutes that he addressed as potentially unconstitutional
within his signing statements).
22 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983); see ANTONIN SCAuA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 29-36 (1997) (arguing against the increased use of legislative history as a
source for statutory construction).
23 Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007, 42
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1703, 1704 (Sept. 29, 2006); see Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-289, §§ 8039,8064, 120 Stat. 1257, 1282, 1288 (2006).

2007]

SIGNING STATEMENTS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

statement of a committee of conference on a bill as if the statement had the force of
law."'2 The statement then asserts: "The executive branch shall construe the
provision in a manner consistent with the bicameral passage and presentment
requirements of the Constitution for the making of a law. 25 In other words, because
legislative history is not subject to bicameralism and presentment, it cannot be given
legal effect. I do not mean to suggest that I regard this objection as persuasive.
Rather, I mean only to point out that, if one were inclined to regard President Bush's
signing statements as an element of legislative history, those statements themselves
assert that they should not be used for purposes of statutory interpretation.
It is nevertheless still possible to disagree with President Bush's evident view
that legislative history has no place in statutory interpretation and thus to consider
President Bush's signing statements when interpreting the statutes he has signed into
law. There remain two major obstacles to actually using President Bush's signing
statements. First, many of the President's signing statements abuse the avoidance
canon. Second, President Bush's statements, on examination, contain nothing that
an interpreter could use. They are stated in such vague and conclusory terms that
they offer nothing useful to the enterprise of interpretation.
The avoidance canon refers to the precept of statutory construction that
advocates adopting the interpretation of a statute that avoids a serious constitutional
question when such an interpretation is fairly plausible.26 The canon, then, has two
predicate conditions. First, one plausible interpretation must raise a serious-not
a frivolous or speculative-constitutional question.2 7 Second, the alternative
interpretation-the one that avoids the serious constitutional question-must be a
plausible interpretation of the statute, lest the avoidance canon become a tool for
rewriting a statute.28
President Bush's signing statements are written using a formula that does not
take account of or satisfy the first condition. The statement will claim that a certain
interpretation of a specified provision "would be inconsistent with" some
presidential power.29 The signing statements rarely, if ever, explain how the objectionable provision could be inconsistent with presidential power or whether the
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,
42 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 23 (Jan. 6, 2006); National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1222, 119 Stat. 3136, 3463 (2006).
25 Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,
42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 23 (Jan. 6, 2006).
26 Morrison, supra note 7, at 1202-03 (defining the avoidance canon).
27 See id. at 1203.
28 See Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 481 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see also Morrison, supra note 7, at 1209 (criticizing the avoidance canon as
contrary to congressional intent).
29 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007,
24

42 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1703, 1704 (Sept. 29, 2006).
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potential inconsistency is likely to arise. Moreover, the signing statements offer no
elaboration of their various theories of presidential power, so there is no basis on
which to determine whether the asserted constitutional problem is a serious one or
is based on an unfounded theory of constitutional law. For example, President
Bush's signing statements object on 363 occasions to provisions that could be
inconsistent with the President's "constitutional authority to supervise the unitary
executive branch." 3 ° No signing statement offers any explanation of what the
President means by "the unitary executive branch" or provides illuminating
consideration of how the provision at issue might be inconsistent with the theory.
President Bush's signing statements also generally fail to satisfy the second
predicate condition because the alternative interpretation that they offer is rarely a
plausible interpretation of the statute's text. For example, the signing statements
frequently object to requirements that executive branch officials make reports or
recommendations to Congress or that appointees to certain offices meet certain
qualifications. Although these statutory provisions are specifically phrased as
requirements (and the signing statements themselves even refer to them as requirements),3 ' President Bush's signing statements typically respond to such requirements
by construing them as advisory. This is not construction but a refusal to enforce.
Beyond the problematic misuse of the avoidance canon, President Bush's
signing statements contain no useful interpretive guidance. Instead, they express
constitutional conclusions without any analysis or explanation that might assist an
interpreter of the statute. In this context, consider again the objection to provisions
that could be inconsistent with the President's "authority to supervise the unitary
32
executive branch.
The conclusory assertions of President Bush's signing statements are not
problematic when the basis for the objection is clear and uncontroversial. For
example, President Bush has objected to 235 provisions that contain legislative
vetoes in violation of INS v. Chadha.33 It is clear what the objection to these
provisions is, and it is equally clear that Chadhahas settled the constitutional question
as to all legislative vetoes. 4 No elaboration is needed in the signing statement.
Where the basis of the constitutional objection is not as clear, President Bush's
signing statements do not provide useful guidance. The signing statements consistently
lack any elaboration beyond short-hand categorizations, such as "unitary executive."
30

Energy & Water Dev. Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-66, 115 Stat. 486

(2001).
3" The favored formulation of these signing statements is that the provision "purports to
require" a report or recommendation, for example. Of course, to say that a provision purports
to require something is to concede that its plain textual meaning is to require that something.
Thus, treating the provision as advisory conflicts with the provision's plain meaning.
32 See 115 Stat. 486 (2001).
3 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
31 See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,
501 U.S. 252 (1991); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
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This leaves an interpreter to guess at the actual basis of the President's objection.
Moreover, the statements repeatedly fail to provide any sense of how the objectionable provision might conflict with the President's legal theory. For example,
President Bush objected to Section 8098 of the Department of Defense and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States.35 Because this section "purport[s] to limit
...the number of Department of Defense military and civilian personnel assigned
to legislative affairs . . . and to mandate the percentage distribution of such

personnel among various offices of the Department," the section could be inconsistent "with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the executive
branch and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. 36 Evidently, the
Commander-in-Chief Clause not only means the President may order the military
to take a particular hill in a theater of war, the President may also order the
military's lobbyists to take Capitol Hill. It would appear that this objection rests on
the same view of presidential power expressed in a memorandum that later supported the infamous torture memo. 37 But the torture memo was never officially
released (and was repudiated after it was leaked) so there is no certain way to know
precisely upon what theory of presidential power this signing statement rests. Because
the conclusion is highly contestable, the conclusion alone has no persuasive force.
Finally, the conclusions found in President Bush's signing statements are
sometimes contradictory. In over twenty instances, President Bush objected to
provisions that required the President to consult with Congress in advance of taking
a particular action.38 These statements assert that a statute may not require
consultation as a precondition to presidential action. 39 The 235 objections to
legislative vetoes assert that the executive branch will construe the invalid
legislative vetoes as report-and-wait requirements.4n I do not doubt that the Justice
31 Statement on Signing the Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental

Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States
Act, 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 46, 48 (Jan. 10, 2002).
36

Id.

31 Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., to Timothy Flanigan,
Deputy Counsel to the President, The President's Constitutional Authority to Conduct
Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001),

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm. The torture memo was issued
eight months later but appears to have been emblematic of the Justice Department's view of
the President's Commander-in-Chief power during this time frame. See, e.g., Memorandum
from Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President,
(Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/
dojinterrogationmemo2002080.pdf. See generally Mike Ailen & Dana Priest, Memo on
Torture Draws Focus to Bush, WASH. POST, June 9, 2004, at A3.
38 See supra note 37.
39 Id.

40Id.
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Department's Office of Legal Counsel has a theory that reconciles these seemingly
inconsistent statements. But, first, we do not know what that theory might be
because the signing statements do not express it or cite to legal memoranda
containing the theory. Second, whatever that reconciling theory might be, it will
surely be contestable. In this setting, the mere conclusion expressed in the signing
statements cannot itself be treated as useful guidance to the meaning or proper
interpretation of the statute.
The vast body of President Bush's signing statements is subject to a variety of
criticisms. The most significant from the standpoint of statutory interpretation is
that, although they typically purport to offer a saving interpretation of the
objectionable provision, those interpretations are frequently so tendentious that they
cannot be taken to express a true attempt at interpretation. Rather, those of President
Bush's signing statements that cite constitutional objections generally represent an
attempt to alter the meaning of those statutes or to exempt the President and the
executive branch from their coverage. Yet none of those statements purports to
offer guidance to interpreters outside the executive branch. In fact, they are so illsuited to such a use that it is doubtful President Bush means for them to be taken as
a component of a statute's legislative history.

